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INTRODUCTION
The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 (ARPA)' was
created to cure the "deficiencies"' of the Antiquities Act of 1906.' In
1974, the Ninth Circuit, under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, de-
clared portions of the Antiquities Act to be unconstitutional.4 For
many years, however, the Act functioned as a "law enforcement tool,'
'
through which looters of public archaeological sites could be prose-
cuted for their illicit deeds. Although the scope of protection under
'J.D. Candidate 2003, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 1999, Yale University. I
wish to thank Professors Patty Gerstenblith, Catherine T. Struve, and Bruce H. Mann for their
invaluable assistance throughout the comment-drafting process. I also wish to thank Erena R.
Jurist and GeoffreyJ. Starks for meeting my transportation needs throughout the revision proc-
ess.
I Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721 (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-mm (2001)). The following federal government agencies
have issued uniform regulations for purposes of ARPA implementation: the Department of the
Interior (43 C.F.R. § 7 (2001)), the Department of Agriculture (36 C.F.R. § 296 (2002)), the
Tennessee Valley Authority (18 C.F.R. § 1312 (2002)), and the Department of Defense (32
C.F.R. § 229 (2002)).
2 125 CONG. REC. 21,239 (1979) ("Because of certain deficiencies in existing law [the An-
tiquities Act of 1906], it has become evident that new authority is critically needed to insure
adequate protection of these priceless resources.") (statement of Sen. Bumpers); see also
Stephanie Ann Ades, The Archaeological Resources Protection Act: A New Application in the Private
Property Context, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 599, 601 (1995) ("Congress enacted ARPA because its
predecessor, the Antiquities Act of 1906, contained unconstitutionally vague terms and there-
fore no longer was effective in combating archaeological looting.").
3 Antiquities Act of 1906, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (codified at 16 U.S.C.§§ 431-433 (2001)).
This Act protects "any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity, situ-
ated on lands owned by the Government of the United States." Id. at § 433.
4 See United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that terms stch as
"object of antiquity" were undefined within the Antiquities Act and thus were "fatally vague"
and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution).
5 Francis P. McManamon, Ownership and Protection of Heritage: Cultural Property Rights for the
21st Century: Cultural Resources and Protection under United States Law, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 247,
265 (2001).
6 SHERRY HUTIr et al., ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESOURCES PROTECTION 20 (1992).
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the Antiquities Act has diminished due in part to the rise of ARPA,
the Act still remains in force for violations of paleontological materi-
als and historic sites less than 50 years old.'
Some scholars praise ARPA for having the clarity and more readily
enforceable provisions that the Antiquities Act lacked. Others cau-
tion that ARPA should not be viewed as a "panacea" for the preserva-
tion and prevention of destruction of archaeological resources lo-
cated on lands under the aegis of federal law.9 I am inclined to turn
my attention and energy elsewhere.
The primary focus of this Comment is on the language of the
Property Clause"' of the United States Constitution and its potential
applicability to ARPA. The Property Clause states, in relevant part,
"[t]he Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property be-
longing to the United States. . . ."" I will embark on a journey into
the constitutional realm of ARPA, using as my backdrop the Property
Clause. Specifically, I am searching for an answer to the following
question: Can we view ARPA as valid Property Clause legislation un-
der the Kleppe v. New Mexico"2 standard? Although the legislative his-
tory of the Act does not indicate that ARPA was enacted pursuant to
the Property Clause," with respect to the "public lands" of the Act,
ARPA comports with the Kleppe Property Clause standard. Yet, ARPA
cannot be deemed Property Clause legislation with respect to the
Act's coverage of "Indian lands" 14 because such lands fall outside of
the scope of the Property Clause. "
7 Id. at 22. At least one commentator claims that the Antiquities Act continues to serve the
following three functions: 1) the Act announced the basic public policies regarding archaeo-
logical resources in the United States; 2) it afforded the President power to designate places for
"special preservation, commemoration, and interpretation;" and 3) the Act required "profes-
sionalism and a scientific approach to excavation, removal, or other investigation of archaeo-
logical resources on the public lands." McManamon, supra note 5, at 257.
8 See, e.g., McManamon, supra note 5, at 266 (stating that ARPA's definition of the resources
covered by the law, its list of proscribed activities and the concomitant penalties, and its distinc-
tion between felony and misdemeanor sanctions "improved on the Antiquities Act").
See, e.g., HUTr, supra note 6, at 31 (stating that although ARPA does not have a panacea
function, it "is a tool that provides opportunities not available under traditional criminal stat-
utes").
10 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
1 Id.
12 426 U.S. 529, 536 (1976). See infra text accompanying notes 53-68 for a discussion of the
Kleppe standard of Property Clause legislation.
13 See generally 125 CONG. REC. 17,391, 21,237 (1979) for the substance of congressional
debates pertinent to ARPA's enactment.
14 ARPA employs the term "Indian" to describe Native Americans. For purposes of consis-
tency, in this Comment, I will use the term "Indian lands" to describe lands owned by Native
Americans. It is not my intention to offend anyone by the use of this term.
15 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (limiting Congressional powers of disposition and regula-
tion to "[t]erritory or other [p]roperty belonging to the United States").
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I have organized my inquiry in the following manner. First, I will
consider two competing constructions of the Property Clause. Sec-
ond, I will introduce major provisions of ARPA. Finally, I will evalu-
ate ARPA under the Kleppe v. New Mexicot6 standard of Property
Clause legislation. Moreover, I acknowledge that there may be policy
considerations and/or potential effects upon application of ARPA
that may result from my analysis. In this Comment, however, I am
merely concerned with providing a constitutional context for ARPA's
enactment through a discussion of the Property Clause.
I. THE PROPERTY CLAUSE: THE "CLASSIC THEORY""
7
V. THE "REAL CLASSIC THEORY""8
There is an intellectual debate over the proper interpretation of
the Property Clause.' 9 On the one hand, there is a camp of individu-
als ("classic theorists") that ardently support constrained congres-
sional power over lands deemed to fall under the Property Clause.0
On the other hand, there is another camp of individuals ("real classic
theorists"), backed by the Supreme Court of the United States, that
advocate an expansive reading of the Clause." This section will con-
sider the opposing views amongst the two groups."
16 Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 536.
17 See David E. Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 296
(1976) (employing the term "classic property clause doctrine" to describe an interpretation of
the Property Clause that greatly limits the Article 1V powers of Congress). I have borrowed the
term "classic theorist" from Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic" Property Clause Theory, 63
N.C. L. REV. 617, 620 (1985).
18 See Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic" Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C.L. REV. 617, 655
(1985) (employing the term "real classic theory" to describe the Supreme Court's view of the
Property Clause under Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976)). Gaetke describes the "real
classic theory" as being more expansive than the "classic theory." Id.
19 See id. at 619 (noting that the different constructions of the Property Clause "range to the
extremes"); see also Engdahl, supra note 17, at 291-292 ("The fact that this one clause [the Prop-
erty Clause] is taken as the source both of federal power over property not within the borders of
any state, and of federal power over property that is within a state which has constitutional pow-
ers of its own, has given rise to considerable confusion.").
20 Gaetke, supra note 18, at 619-620. Throughout this Comment, the "classic theorist" term
will be used to describe individuals who subscribe to the "classic property clause doctrine" as
enunciated by Engdahl, supra note 17, at 296.
21 Gaetke, supra note 18, at 654-55. Throughout this Comment, the "real classic theorist"
term will be used to describe individuals who subscribe to the "real classic theory" as defined by
Gaetke. Id. at 655.
For an extensive discussion of the historical development of the Property Clause and the
opposing viewpoints on the proper construction of the Clause see Gaetke, supra note 18. 1 will
highlight the basic elements of each perspective that Gaetke expounds upon in an effort to cre-
ate a framework for a Property Clause application to ARPA.
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A. The "Classic Theorist" Notion of the Property Clause
There are two "alternative contentions" that comprise the "classic
theory" of the Property Clause: First, the unconstitutionality of fed-
eral retention of title to public lands within a state; and second, if
such retention of title is permissible, the limitation of congressional
23
power as a proprietor over private property located within a state.
Barring two exceptions, the second contention of the "classic theory"
does not recognize the preemptive effects of legislation enacted pur-
24
suant to the Property Clause over contrary state law.
1. Federal Retention of Title to Public Lands within a State
Some "classic theorists" claim that the Property Clause does not
bestow upon the federal government the right to hold title to public
lands that are located within a state. 5 Under this view, Congress may
only exercise its Property Clause power over public lands that have
not yet been admitted into the Union.2 Once a state is admitted into
the Union, "classic theorists" argue that Congress must cede its Prop-
erty Clause dominion over the public lands and transfer ownership to
the state or private individuals. 7 "Classic theorists," nevertheless, rec-
ognize congressional power under the United States Constitution, Ar-
ticle I, Section 8, Clause 17 as a "mechanism" through which Con-
gress may obtain valid title to lands within a state and "exclusive
legislation" over those lands even after a territory has been admitted
into the Union.2"
23 I. at 620-21.
24 Id. at 651.
25 Id. at 621. Cf Engdahl, supra note 17, at 292-93:
It was not contemplated ... that by acquiring territory the United States should accumu-
late and permanently hold a vast national domain outside the bounds of the states which
constituted the Union .... [Bloth federal title and the federal exercise of governmental
jurisdiction in these lands were regarded as temporary-a transitional phase.
26 Gaetke, supra note 18, at 621.
27 Id.
Id. at 633; see id. at 619 n.5 (stating that Congress has power over "certain federal lands"
(also known as "federal enclaves") under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17). These powers enable
Congress:
to exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceed-
ing ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Con-
gress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like
Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in
which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards and
other needful Buildings.
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2. Congress as a Proprietor of Private Property within a State
Other "classic theorists" assert that if it is constitutional for the
federal government to hold title to lands within a state under the
Property Clause, Congress' power over those lands is restricted to that
of a proprietor over his private property. ' It follows then that be-
cause of Congress' limited power as a proprietor over the federal
lands, states are empowered to exercise the same governmental juris-
diction over these lands as they would over private property also lo-
cated within the state. 0 Thus as a landowner, Congress' will must
yield to contrary state law, and this necessarily subordinates federal
Property Clause legislation to contrary state law.
Nonetheless, as noted above, "classic theorists" who would limit
Congress' authority under the Property Clause to that of a proprietor
maintain that there are two instances in which federal Proper
Clause legislation has preemptive effect over contrary state law:
First, preemptive effect is given to Property Clause legislation that is
created in order to maintain congressional control over the acquisi-
tion of title to federal lands and states cannot control such land dis-
tribution. 3' This exception is rooted in the unequivocal power that
the Property Clause grants to Congress "[to dispose of Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States. ''
Second, preemptive effect over contrary state law is justified when
Congress enacts Property Clause legislation pursuant to a desire to
protect federal lands from a perceived harm.3' In the eyes of the
"classic theorist," the "harm" that is being perpetrated against the
federal land appears in the form of "physical threats to the land. '8
Accordingly, Congress, out of necessity, is warranted in taking action37 3 8 .
to cease such harm: Camfield v. United States is the foundation upon
which the "classic theorists" build their second exception.: It is es-
sential to discuss this case in some detail because the Supreme Court
2 Id. at 621. For a discussion of how Congress' role as a proprietor of private property dif-
fers from that of an "ordinary proprietor" see Engdahl, supra note 17, at 308-10, 361-62.
.9 Gaetke, supra note 18, at 621.
31 Id. at 621-22. See Engdahl, supra note 17, at 310 (stating that although Congress as a pro-
prietor may use its property in many ways, such uses are within the purview of state governmen-
tal jurisdiction and are not endowed with federal preemptive authority).
32 Gaetke, supra note 18, at 651.
31 See id. at 651-52 n.224 (citing Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 516-17; Bagnell v.
Broderick, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 436, 450-51 (1839)).
34 Gaetke, supra note 18, at 652.
Id.
Id. at 653.
37 Id.
167 U.S. 518 (1897).
Gaetke, supra note 18, at 652.
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relies upon its reasoning in Camfield to reach its holding in Kleppe v.
New Mexico.*'
In Camfield, the United States sued the defendants, adjacent land-
owners, for building a fence that enclosed several acres of federal
lands, thereby impeding the plaintiff's and interested settlers' use of
and access to the federal lands.4 ' The United States initiated pro-
ceedings against the defendants based upon the Act of Congress of
February 25, 1885, referred to as "[a]n act to prevent unlawful occu-
pancy of the public lands., 42 The district court held that the defen-
dant's enclosure of the federal lands constituted a violation of the
Act, and the court of appeals affirmed.43
The Supreme Court held that the fence was a nuisance and that
Congress, by virtue of the Act, had the authority to order the abate-
ment of the fence.44 Congress was imbued with such preemptive
authority even though the Act "directly conflicted with state common
law which permitted the fencing of private lands., 45 The fence was a
nuisance because, although it was constructed entirely on the defen-
dants' land, it had the effect of closing off the adjacent federal lands;
this was an improper enclosure and therefore a contravention of the
Act.4c
The Court also recognized the federal government's police power
over its lands within a state and in doing so implied its desire to pre-
serve the congressional policy behind the Act.4 v The Court deferred
40 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
41 Camfield, 167 U.S. at 519.
42 Unlawful Occupancy of Public Lands Fencing Act, ch. 149, 23 Stat. 321 (1885). The Act
provides:
That all enclosures of any public lands in any State or Territory of the United
States ... erected or constructed by any person, party, association or corporation to any
of which land included within the enclosure the person, party, association or corpora-
tion making or controlling the enclosure had no claim or color of title made or acquired
in good faith, or an asserted right thereto by or under claim, made in good faith with a
view to entry thereof at the proper land office under the general laws of the United
States at the time any such enclosure was or shall be made, are hereby declared to be un-
lawful, and the maintenance, erection, construction or control of any such enclosure is
hereby forbidden and prohibited; and the assertion of a right to the exclusive use and
occupancy of any part of the public lands of the United States in any State or any of the
Territories of the United States, without claim, color of title or asserted right, as above
specified as to enclosure, is likewise declared and hereby prohibited.
Id. at 521-22.
43 Camfield, 167 U.S. at 521.
44 Id. at 525.
4r See Gaetke, supra note 18, at 652-53 (citing Camfield, 167 U.S. at 523).
4 See Canfield, 167 U.S. at 525 (stating that the law would be unnecessary if it were construed
to apply only to fences built upon public lands because the government, as a proprietor, could
prosecute for trespass).
47 See id. ("The general Government doubtless has a power over its own property analogous
to the police power of the several States, and the extent to which it may go in the exercise of
such power is measured by the exigencies of the particular case.").
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to the congressional policy of the "protection of the public, or of in-
tending settlers, [by] forbid[ding] all enclosures of public lands."
''
Contrary to the "classic theorists"' claim that the Court was protecting
the plaintiff's lands from harm, Professor Gaetke argues that Con-
gress was interested in "protecting its policy for the use of federal
lands, not the federal lands themselves., 49 The Court's opinion ap-
pears to be in accordance with this view. °
B. The "Real Classic Theory" of Property Clause Legislation
According to Professor Gaetke, the "real classic theory" of Prop-
erty Clause legislation is encapsulated in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Kleppe v. New Mexico. This theory is not only a broad con-
struction of the Property Clause, but also is preemptive of contrary
state law.52
In Kleppe v. New Mexico,53 the plaintiffs, the State of New Mexico,
the New Mexico Livestock Board and its director, and a purchaser of
seized burros, sought a declaratory judgment that the Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Act was unconstitutional and they peti-
tioned the court for an injunction against the Act's enforcement.
55
48Id.
49 Gaetke, supra note 18, at 654.
% Camfield, 167 U.S. at 525.
51 Gaetke, supra note 18, at 654-55. See generally Engdahl, supra note 17, at 349-58 for a dis-
cussion of how the Supreme Court "unwittingly revolutionized its article IV property clause doc-
trine" and misconstrued and misapplied its previous Property Clause jurisprudence in Kleppe v.
New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). Id. at 349.
52 Gaetke, supra note 18, at 654-55. According to Engdahl, supra note 17, at 349, the Su-
preme Court in Kleppe unnecessarily construed the Property Clause in a manner that was incon-
sistent with "the cardinal thesis of the classic article V property clause doctrine." For a discus-
sion of four grounds upon which the Kleppe Court could have upheld the New Mexico Estray
Law and declined to make, as Engdahl states, a "depart[ure] from property power precedents,"
see Engdahl, supra note 17, at 349-50.
53 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
54 The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, Pub. L. No. 92-195, 85 Stat. 649 (1971)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340). Section 1331 provides:
Congress finds and declares that wild free-roaming horses and burros are living symbols
of the historic and pioneer spirit of the West; that they contribute to the diversity of life
forms within the Nation and enrich the lives of the American people; and that these
horses and burros are fast disappearing from the American scene. It is the policy of
Congress that wild free-roaming horses and burros shall be protected from capture,
branding, harassment, or death; and to accomplish this they are to be considered in the
area where presently found, as an integral part of the natural system of the public lands.
Id. at § 1331.
M Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 534. New Mexico at the time had also enacted an "estray" law in coop-
eration with the Secretary of the Interior, who was given the authority tinder the Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Act to "enter into cooperative agreements with other landowners
and with state and local governmental agencies in furtherance of the Act's purposes." Id. at
532. In Kleppe, the New Mexico Livestock Board had used its "authority" under the state ana-
logue to the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act to remove such animals from public
Oct. 20021
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The district court held that the Act was unconstitutional and perma-
nently enjoined the Secretary of Interior from enforcing it! "
The Supreme Court reversed, announcing that the standard for
determining whether an act of Congress comports with the Property
Clause is to ask whether the regulation can be upheld as "needful"
and "respecting" public lands." The Court, cautioned, however, that
while courts interpret laws, Congress has discretion to assess what is
"needful" under the Property Clause•" Although the Court conceded
that it had not yet passed upon the ultimate reach of congressional
power under the Property Clause, it reiterated its previously held
stance that "[the] power over the public land thus entrusted to Con-
gress is without limitations. 59 The Court also proclaimed that Con-
gress has powers as a proprietor and a legislature over public lands.
6
0
Accordingly, Congress, as a proprietor over its lands, can protect its
lands from trespass and injury-a right bestowed upon a land-
owner-and it can make rules and regulations respecting those lands
in its capacity as a legislature.
The Kleppe Court, upon determining that the Wild Free-Roaming
Horses and Burros Act was "needful" and "respecting" the public
lands, sanctioned the congressional policy underlying the legisla-
ton.62 The congressional policy at stake in Kleppe was Congress' abil-
ity to use its Article IV Property Clause power to "protect 'all
unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on public lands of the
United States ... from capture, branding, harassment, or death."'"
In affording the congressional policy protection, the Court warned
that, though the Property Clause permitted Congress to exercise ple-
nary power over federal lands within a state, the Clause did not im-
lands in response to a landowner's claim that the animals were interfering with his grazing
rights on the same land. Id. at 533. The Board seized the burros and sold them at a public auc-
tion. Id. at 534. The Bureau of Land Management's request for the return of the burros to
public land was unheeded. i.
Id. at 534.
57 Id. at 535-36.
See id. (citing United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29-30 (1940); Light v. United
States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911)).
Id. at 539 (citations omitted).
Id. at 540.
i' Id.
62 Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897) is illustrative of a prior instance in which
the Supreme Court offered support for congressional policy when it upheld federal legislation
pertinent to public lands. In reference to Camfield, the Kl~eppe Court stated: "[W]e have ap-
proved legislation respecting the public lands '[i]f it be found to be necessary for the protection
of the public, or of intending settlers [on public lands]."' See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 540 (quoting
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897)). According to Professor Gaetke, the con-
gressional policy that the Camfield Court sought to protect was "the use of federal lands." See
Gaetke, supra note 18, at 654.
k Id. at 531.
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part to Congress the authority to control the public policy of a state."'
Presumably the Court was concerned about potential federalism is-
sues that could arise if Congress began dictating state public policy
through the exercise of its enumerated powers.
In addition to supporting congressional policy in the case of
"needful" rules or regulations "respecting" federal lands, the Court
also addressed the preemptive effect of such legislation. The Court
stated:
Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over
federal lands within its territory, but Congress equally surely retains the
power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Prop-
erty Clause. And when Congress so acts, the federal legislation necessar-
ily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause.6
The Court thus undoubtedly endorsed the preemptive effect of valid
Property Clause legislation over conflicting state law.
Finally, by making reference to the Camfield decision, the Court
acknowledged that, while the Property Clause governs congressional
power to enact laws that pertain to federal lands, Congress can make
67
laws under its Article IV power that may affect private lands. Al-
though the Court declined to determine the "permissible reach of
the Act over private lands under the Property Clause,"'' it seems likely
that, upon determination of the issue, the Court -will require Con-
gress to show a nexus between conduct on private lands and the ef-
fects of this conduct on public lands to justify the creation of restric-
tive legislation.
II. THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESOURCES PROTECTION ACT OF 1979
Before considering whether ARPA fits into the Property Clause
legislative mold cast by the Supreme Court in Kleppe v. New Mexico,70 it
is necessary to introduce the major provisions of the Act. This section
is devoted to the enactment of ARPA and an overview of a few of its
current provisions.
A See id. at 540 (citing United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940)).
Id. at 542-43.
66 Id. at 543 (citations omitted).
67 See id. at 546 (citing Camfield, 167 U.S. at 525).
CA Id. at 547.
69 See Camfield, 167 U.S at 525 ("If it be found necessary for the protection of the public, or
of intending settlers, to forbid all enclosures of public lands, the Government may do so, though
the alternate sections of private lands are thereby rendered less available for pasturage.") (emphasis
added).
70 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
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A. The Antiquities Act of 1906: The Predecessor of ARPA
The Antiquities Act of 1906,"' recognized as the "nation's first
general purpose cultural resource management statute," was a culmi-
nation of legislative efforts to stop the increasing removal of "ar-•,,72 7
chaeological resources from public lands." According to one
author, the ultimate purpose of the Antiquities Act was "to promote
investigation of historic sites by the scientific community, rather than
by amateurs.., so that artifacts and remains would end up in public
museums." 74 Several commentators agree that the Antiquities Act, al-
though a noble endeavor, did not effectively stymie the growth of ar-
chaeological looting incidences. 75 The Ninth Circuit's 1974 decision
in United States v. Diaz,76 in which it held the Antiquities Act unconsti-
tutional under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, marked the end of
the Act's enforcement in several western states.77 Consequently, the
71 Ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431433 (2001)).
72 ARPA defines "archaeological resource" as:
any material remains of past human life or activities which are of archaeological inter-
est .... Such... [items] include... pottery, basketry, bottles, weapons .... No item
shall be treated as an archaeological resource under regulations under this paragraph
unless such item is at least 100 years of age.
16 U.S.C. § 470bb(l) (2001).
73 THOMAS F. KING, CULTURAL RESOURCE LAWS & PRACrICE: AN INTRODUCIORY GUIDE 13
(1998).
Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in the
United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 579 (1995) (quoting Leonard D. DuBoff, Protecting Native
American Cultures, OR ST. B. BULL, Nov. 1992, at 9, 10).
75 See 125 CONG. REC. 21,240 (1979) (statement of Sen. Hatfield):
[Tihe Antiquities Act... which has provided the legal basis for protecting America's
prehistoric and historic heritage, is no longer adequate. Artifact hunters and collectors
have been descending on national forests, parks, and public lands in ever increasing
numbers. Depredations have occurred primarily in the Southwest but extend to all
States.
Statements by other legislators are also illuminating:
Under the Antiquities Act of 1906, the penalties for such activities amount to a maxi-
mum of $500 and 90 days injail. Coupled with the unlikelihood of being caught in the
vastness of western Federal lands and the holdings by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
that the Antiquities Act was unconstitutionally vague, the potential profit to be gained by
illegal excavation far outweighed any potential risk.
Id. at 17,394 (statement of Rep. Clausen); see also Gerstenblith, supra note 74, at 579 ("The ef-
fectiveness of the statute against unauthorized excavation, however, suffered from years of lax
enforcement and relatively minor penalties."); Ades, supra note 2, at 601 ("Congress enacted
ARPA because its predecessor, the Antiquities Act of 1906, contained unconstitutionally vague
terms and therefore no longer was effective in combating archaeological looting.").
76 499 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the Antiquities Act of 1906 was unconsti-
tutionally vague because the statute used "undefined terms of uncommon usage" such as "ruin"
and "object of antiquity").
See HUTT, supra note 6, at 24 ("[T]he statute [the Antiquities Act] could no longer be
used in those states included in the [N]inth [C]ircuit: Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington."). Senator Domenici underscored the ef-
fect of the Diaz decision during the Congressional debates concerning the enactment of ARPA:
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end of the 1970s was a particularly opportune time for congressional
members to introduce legislation that would potentially remedy the
looting7 problems that the Antiquities Act could 
not.79
B. ARPA: Focal Points of the Statute
ARPA is a multi-part statute that has two specific purposes:"
1) to secure, for the present and future benefit of the American people,
the protection of archaeological resources and sites which are on public
lands and Indian lands, and
2) to foster increased cooperation and exchange of information be-
tween governmental authorities, the professional community, and private
individuals having collections of archaeological resources and data which
were obtained before the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 31,
1979].s
Therefore, ARPA acknowledges that one way to facilitate the protec-
tion of archaeological resources is to encourage education and free-
dom of information between those who will be responsible for effec-
tuating ARPA's programs and policies and those who have extensive
knowledge and/or access to archaeological resources."'
Section 470bb of the Act outlines several definitions that are criti-
cal to the understanding and application of ARPA.83 Of particular in-
terest are the definitions of "archaeological resource, '" "public
The way the law is drawn today, in one whole section of the country, because of a circuit
court opinion, we have no laws that can be enforced against that kind of public domain
thievery. This was called to our attention out in the Southwest by U.S. attorneys who
could not prosecute, who were very much concerned about finding a constitutional way
to define an artifact, which would permit them to prosecute.
See 125 CONG. REC. 21,240 (1979) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
78 See HUT, supra note 6, at 16 (defining archaeological looting as the "illegal unscientific
removal of archaeological resources" and stating that "
[ l]ooting occurs predominantly on pub-
lic and tribal lands" though it "may also take place on private property if unscientific removal of
archaeological resources is carried out without the permission of the owners").
79 See id. at 27 ("While inconsistent court rulings made the need for congressional action
apparent, a number of groups were actively lobbying for new and pervasive legislation. The
efforts of the Society for American Archaeology were responsible for marshalling interested
peole to draft prototype legislation and obtain the attention of congressional sponsors.").
Representative Clausen stated that the primary goal of ARPA legislation was to protect
archaeological resources from "ruinous pillaging and excavation." See 125 CONG. REC. 17,394
(1979) (statement of Rep. Clausen).
81 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b) (2001).
82 Id. See McManamon, supra note 5, at 266 ("ARPA also notes that in order to better protect
and learn about the archaeological record of the United States, cooperation is needed among
government authorities, professional archaeologists and organizations, and interested individu-
als.").
83 See 16 U.S.C. § 470bb (2001).
84 Supra note 72 for the text of the "archaeological resource" definition under 16 U.S.C.
§ 470bb(1) (200 1).
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lands,, 15 and "Indian lands. '86  By explicitly defining the above, the
drafters of ARPA were endeavoring to ensure that the same void-for-
vagueness fate of the Antiquities Act did not befall ARPA. 7
Section 470ee of the Act represents a major shift towards more
stringent enforcement measures and a level of general deterrence
that the Antiquities Act lacked.88 Section 470ee (c) is particularly im-
portant because it extends ARPA protection to archaeological re-
sources that are not derived from public or Indian lands once these
objects are obtained in violation of any state or local law and are
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.8 '  Section 470ee(c)
became controversial in the 1990s when Arthur Gerber became the
first individual to compel a federal court to determine whether or not
ARPA applied to private lands.
In United States v. Gerber,9' the United States sued the defendant
Gerber, for violating Section 470ee(c) of ARPA. Although Gerber
pleaded guilty to transporting Indian artifacts through interstate
commerce-artifacts that he had stolen from a burial mound on pri-
vate land in violation of Indiana state trespass and conversion laws-
he reserved the right to appeal because he claimed that ARPA was in-
K5 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(3) (defining "public lands" as "lands owned and administered by tile
United States as part of the (A) (i) national park system, (A) (ii) national wildlife refuge system,
or (A) (iii) the national forest system" and (B) lands to which the United States holds fee title,
but not including lands "on the Outer Continental Shelf and lands which are under the juris-
diction of the Smithsonian Institution").
K 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(4) (defining "Indian lands" as "lands of Indian tribes, or Indian indi-
viduals, which are either held in trust by the United States or subject to a restriction against al-
ienation imposed by the United States, except for any subsurface interests in lands not owned
or controlled by an Indian tribe or an Indian individual").
87 See 125 CONG. REC. 21,240 (1979):
For many years it was a crime to steal valuable artifacts. It is just that a court has ruled
that, since we did not define the term "artifact," we were going to have to let criminals
loose. The purpose of this bill is to plug that loophole, and at the same time grant those
who have a reasonable and logical right to use the public domain to further their educa-
tion and knowledge of American history to do so, without taking from it valuable arti-
facts.
Id. (statement of Sen. Domenici).
See 125 CONG. REC., 21,239 (1979) ("It is hoped that this legislation will serve as a deter-
rent to the increasing incidence of looting archaeological treasures found on those lands.")
(statement of Sen. Bumpers).
813 See 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(c) ("No person may sell, purchase, exchange, transport, receive, or
offer to sell, purchase, or exchange, in interstate or foreign commerce, any archaeological re-
source excavated, removed, sold, purchased, exchanged, transported, or received in violation of
any provision, rule, regulation, ordinance, or permit in effect under State or local law.").
V Ades, supra note 2, at 613. See United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112, 1113 (7th Cir. 1993)
("The issues are novel because this is the first prosecution under the Act of someone who traf-
ficked in archaeological objects removed from lands other than either federal or Indian
lands.").
999 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1113. For the text of the ARPA provision under which Gerber was charged, see 16
U.S.C. § 47 0ee(c), supra note 89.
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applicable to artifacts that were removed from private lands.93 On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that Section 470ee(c) of ARPA was
applicable to artifacts removed from private lands, lands not owned
by the federal government or by Indian tribes or Indian individuals. 4
Notwithstanding the ingenious arguments that Gerber asserted in
order to limit all of ARPA's provisions to public and Indian lands, the
Seventh Circuit declined to restrict the Act's application to artifacts
derived solely from such lands. 95  Gerber offered cogent evidence
from ARPA's legislative history that Congress was unequivocal in its
desire to limit the scope of the Act to archaeological looting and
preservation on public and Indian lands, but not on private lands.9
The court explained, however, that the legislative history's focus on
public and Indian lands stemmed from the abundance of archaeo-
logical sites located on these lands.' The court also examined the
congressional intent behind Section 470ee(c).9 The Seventh Circuit
stated: "[s]ubsection (c) appears to be a catch-all provision designed
to back up state and local laws protecting archaeological sites and ob-
jects wherever located.""' The court also noted that it was unlikely
that Congress would impose such stringent penalties and fines for
ARPA violations that pertained solely to artifacts that are removed
from public and Indian lands.'1
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit rejected Gerber's argument that
Section 470ee (c)'s application was limited to artifacts removed from
private lands in violation of state and local laws specifically aimed at
protecting such objects. 1°' The court conceded that the state or local
93 See Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1113.
94 See id. at 1116 ("We conclude that section 470ee(c) is not limited to objects removed
from federal and Indian lands.").
95 Id. at 1115-17.
96 Id. at 1115. See 125 CONG. REC. 17,393-94 (1979) ("I want to emphasize in the boldest
terms possible what this bill does not do ... [i]t does not affect any lands other than the public
lands of the United States and lands held in trust by the United States for Indian tribes or indi-
vidual Indian allottees.") (statement by Rep. Udall).
97 See Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1115 ("That the statute, the scholarly commentary, and the legisla-
tive history are all focused on federal and Indian lands may simply reflect the fact that the vast
majority of Indian sites - and virtually all archaeological sites in the Western Hemisphere are
Indian - are located either in Indian reservations or on the vast federal public lands of the
West.").
98 Id.
Id. SeeAdes, supra note 2, at 622 n.196 ("[T]he intent behind this act is to protect unique
or one-of-a-kind items in a true archaeological setting." (citing 125 CONG. REC. 17,395 (1979)
(statement of Rep. Pashayan)).
100 See Gerber, 999 U.S. at 1116 ("It is also unlikely that a Congress sufficiently interested in
archaeology to impose substantial criminal penalties for the violation of archaeological regula-
tions.., would be so parochial as to confine its interests to archaeological sites and artifacts on
federal and Indian lands merely because that is where most of them are.").
101 See id. at 1116-17 (stating that Gerber's interpretation might "compel states desiring fed-
eral assistance in protecting Indian artifacts in non-federal, non-Indian lands within their bor-
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law that is violated must be related to Section 470ee(c), but stated
that this did not mean that the specific law had to be limited to the
protection of archaeological resources. 12 The court concluded that,
because Indiana's trespass and conversion laws were related to the
protection of archaeological resources, 5 the violation of such state or
local laws would invoke the protection afforded by Section
470ee(c) .'O
III. ARPA AND THE "REAL CLASSic THEORY"
OF PROPERTY CLAUSE LEGISLATION
Recall that under the "real classic theory"'0 5 of Property Clause leg-
islation the Supreme Court asks one fundamental question: Can the
congressional regulation/legislation be sustained as "needful" and
"respecting" public lands?'O I will now evaluate whether ARPA can be
wholly conceived of as Property Clause legislation under the "real
classic theory" by examining two aspects of the statute. I will consider
whether 1) the meaning of "public lands" as defined by ARPA, Sec-
ders to pass laws that might duplicate protections already adequate conferred on landowners
sitting atop undiscovered archaeological sites by existing laws of general applicability").
IN See id. at 1116 ("[W]e agree with the general point, that the Act is limited to cases in which
the violation of state law is related to the protection of archaeological sites or objects .... But
we do not think that to be deemed related to the protection of archaeological resources a state
or local law must be limited to that protection.").
103 See id. (stating that Indiana's trespass and conversion laws had "objectives that include but
are not exhausted in the protection of Indian artifacts and other antiquities").
104 Id.
105 According to one group of "classic theorists," the federal government is holding public
lands that are protected under ARPA unconstitutionally because under the "classic theory," "the
property clause does not authorize federal retention of title to public lands within the bounda-
ries of states" unless the federal government holds such lands pursuant to the U.S. Constitution
art. 1, § 8, cl. 17. Gaetke, supra note 18, at 621 nn.22-23. Thus, it is likely that these "classic
theorists" would not deem it necessary to discuss whether ARPA is valid Property Clause legisla-
tion. Furthermore, the group of "classic theorists" who subscribe to the belief that Congress
may act as a proprietor over its lands within a state may be willing to recognize ARPA as valid
Property Clause legislation in two instances. First, Congress, as a proprietor of private property,
may act to prohibit trespass and theft of objects contained on its land. See Kleppe v. New Mex-
ico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976) ("[T]he Property Clause gives Congress the power over the public
lands 'to control their occupancy and use, to protect them from trespass and injury and to pre-
scribe the conditions upon which others may obtain rights in them .... '") (quoting Utah Power
& Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1917) (overruled on other grounds)). Yet, in
this instance, it is questionable whether ARPA would be granted preemptive effect if Congress
merely uses its authority as a private proprietor to protect its lands. Second, ARPA could be
viewed as legislation that is protecting public lands from "harm" and thus preemptive of con-
trary state law. It seems likely that the "loss and destruction" of archaeological resources could
be construed as harm that is being perpetrated against public and Indian lands. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 470aa(b) (2001) (stating the following as one purpose of ARPA: "to secure, for the present
and future benefit of the American people, the protection of archaeological resources and sites
which are on public lands and Indian lands").
106 Keppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 536 (1976).
[Vol. 5:1
ARPA AS PROPEtTY CLA USE LEGISLATION
tion 470bb(3), and 2) the meaning of "Indian lands" as defined by
ARPA, Section 470bb(4) both support a view of ARPA as Property
Clause legislation under Kleppe v. New Mexico. 0 7 I have chosen these
two sections as focal points for my analysis because the "public lands"
definition of ARPA is what brings the Act into the general purview of
the Property Clause, and the "Indian lands" definition is a major
component of the Act that prevents it from being construed strictly as
Property Clause legislation. 08
A. Part One: Property Clause Application to ARPA 's "Public Lands"
Part one of the ARPA-Property Clause analysis is straightforward.
The legislative history of ARPA is replete with testimonials by mem-
bers of Congress and others who advocated a new act that would pro-
vide enhanced protection and preservation of archaeological re-
sources. Congress thus determined that ARPA legislation was
"needful." Whether or not ARPA "respects" public lands is also ame-
nable to simple resolution. "Public lands" under ARPA are lands in
which the United States owns fee title."0 Under the Property Clause,
public lands are lands that belong to the United States.' Therefore,
it is indisputable that ARPA, in part, is legislation that pertains to ar-
chaeological resources that are located on lands that belong to the
United States."
2
B. Part Two: Property Clause Application to ARPA 's "Indian Lands"
Part two of the ARPA-Property Clause analysis cannot be disposed
of with comparable ease because "Indian lands," as defined by ARPA,
107 Id.
106I have chosen only to focus on the "Indian lands" definition as one aspect of ARPA that
prevents it from being construed solely as Property Clause legislation. I am not of the opinion
that this is the only provision of the Act that presents similar difficulties. In particular,
§ 470ee(c) of the Act bases its jurisdictional hook to ARPA on congressional power to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce pursuant to the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3. Thus it is reasonable to conclude that in creating § 470ee(c) Congress did not rely on its Ar-
ticle IV Property Clause authority.
109 See generally 125 CONG. REC 17,393-96, 21,239-43 (1979) for various statements by mem-
bers of Congress regarding the demonstrated need for ARPA legislation as a response to the
largely unchecked looting activities that the Antiquities Act could not effectively extinguish. See
also supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text (discussing the "deficiencies" of the Antiquities Act,
such as "lax enforcement" and vaguely defined terms of the Act, and ARPA's anticipated solu-
tion to the vexing problems of the Antiquities Act).
110 16 U.S.C. at § 470bb(3). See 125 CONG. REC. 17,394 (1979) ("The term 'public land' was
amended to clarify that only lands which are owned in fee title by the United States are covered
by this act.") (statement of Rep. Clausen).
I U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
112 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b) (2001).
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are not lands that belong to the United States."3 Consequently, it
would be improper to conclude that Congress included "Indian
lands" within ARPA's scope by virtue of its Article IV Property Clause
authority to legislate over lands belonging to the United States.'
4
Under ARPA, "Indian lands" are "lands of Indian tribes, or Indian
individuals, which are either held in trust by the United States or sub-
ject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States,"
but are essentially lands in which the United States does not own the
fee title."5 The Act's legislative history appears to be in accordance
with this interpretation. For example, Senator Dale Bumpers pro-
posed the following amendment to the "Indian lands" definition of
the ARPA Bill, S. 490: "The term 'Indian lands' means land the fee
title to which is held by Indian tribes, or Indian individuals, either in
trust by the United States or subject to a restriction against alienation
imposed by the United States."''. Why are "Indian lands" not defined
as lands to which the United States holds fee title? Perhaps the an-
swer to this query may be found in the corpus of Indian trust law.
While a thorough analysis of the Indian trust doctrine is truly beyond
the scope of this Comment, I will briefly consider the meaning of this
doctrine for purposes of ARPA's "Indian lands" definition.
1. The Indian Trust Doctrine
The Indian trust doctrine is derived from the common law,"7 and
the term is used to describe the federal-tribal relationship between
the United States and Indians. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,"9 the
seminal case for the Indian trust doctrine, Chief Justice Marshall de-
clared that the relationship between the United States and Indians
113 See id. § 470bb(4).
14 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (authorizing congressional authority to legislate over
"Territory or other Property belonging to the United States"); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S.
529, 536 (1976) (upholding "needfl regulation respecting the public lands" as valid Property
Clause legislation).
11 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(4) (2001).
16 See 125 CONG. REC. 21,239 (1976) ("The third and final amendment clarifies the term
'Indian lands' to mean those lands in which fee title is held by Indian tribes, or Indian individu-
als.") (statement of Sen. Bumpers).
117 See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 220 (Rennard Strickland ed.,
1982) ("The concept of a federal trust responsibility to Indians evolved judicially. It first ap-
peared in ... Cherokee Nation v. Georgia."); see also Susan D. Baer, The Public Trust Doctrine-A Tool
to Make Federal Administrative Agencies Increase Protection of Public Land and Its Resources, 15 B.C.
ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 385, 428 (1988) (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1
(1831)).
lit COHEN, supra note 117, at 207. Cohen also noted that the trust responsibility restricts
congressional as well as federal administrative power. Id. at 221, 225.
,19 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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,, 1. ,,120"resembles that of a ward to his guardian. At least one modern
court has described the trust relationship in terms of the elements of
a common-law trust in which the United States is the trustee, the In-
dian allottees are the beneficiaries, and Indian timber, lands, and
funds form the trust corpus."'
According to Felix S. Cohen, "the trust relationship is one of the
primary cornerstones of Indian law."'2 Cohen further described the
relationship between the United States and Indians as being "prem-
ised upon broad but not unlimited federal constitutional power over
Indian affairs, often described as 'plenary,"' and one "distinguished
by special trust obligations requiring the United States to adhere
strictly to fiduciary standards in its dealings with Indians."'' 3 Cohen
also asserted that case law indicates that a single power, "an amalgam
of several specific constitutional provisions" including the Indian
124 125Commerce Clause, the Treaty Clause, and the SupremacyClause, 2 6 govern such "Indian affairs."'2 7
2. Is there Property Clause Authority over "Indian Lands"?
Cohen argued, rather convincingly, that while courts in the past
have viewed the Property Clause as a source of authority over Indian
lands, such lands cannot properly be characterized as "public lands"
to which the United States owns fee title. lz  Johnson v. M'Intoshl'
stands for the proposition that discovery vested fee simple title of I .-
dian lands in the hands of European colonial powers (the sover-
eigns), subject to the Indian "right of occupancy" or "Indian title.""'"
A sovereign was the only one empowered to extinguish the "right of
occupancy," and Indians could not convey title to their lands without
120 Id. at 17.
121 See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 2 cmt. h at 10 (1959)).
22 COHEN, supra note 117, at 221.
123 Id. at 207.
124 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating Congress has the power to regulate commerce with
the Indian tribes).
125 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the Executive branch the power to enter into
treaties).
12 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
127 COHEN, supra note 117, at 211.
12 Id. at 209.
129 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
130 See COHEN, supra note 117 n.16, at 209 (citingJohnson, 21 U.S. at 574). Essentially, Cohen
described "Aboriginal Indian Title" as "unrecognized" title which means Congress has not
granted a tribe that holds such titled lands the "full beneficial fee interest in the property" in
which the United States cannot recapture previously granted property rights without remitting
just compensation to the affected tribe. Id. at 485.
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the permission of the sovereign.13' The fee simple ownership of the
European powers passed to the United States after it became an in-
dependent nation. 2 While Cohen acknowledges that one could
make the argument that "Indian title" lands are technically
"[piroperty belonging to the United States" and hence subject to
Property Clause authority, he states that Indian lands are best classi-
fied as "private property, subject to broad congressional control and
special fiduciary obligations, rather than as public lands or other fed-
eral territory or property."'13' This classification is more in line with
current conceptions of the trust relationship, in which "[m]ost In-
dian lands are held in trust by the United States for the exclusive use
and benefit of specific tribes."'4
3. Indian Trust Status or Restriction against Alienation
of "Indian Lands" under ARPA
What effect does the foregoing have on the ARPA definition of
"Indian lands"? The most obvious answer is that "Indian lands" are
not "public lands," and even though ARPA's extension of protection
to public lands falls squarely within the Kleppe v. New Mexico' Prop-
erty Clause standard, the same cannot be said of ARPA's application
to Indian lands. Furthermore, the statutory definition of "Indian
lands" offers maximum protection of archaeological resources on
such lands because even if the Indian lands are not held in trust by
the United States, they may be subject to a restriction against aliena-
tion. 136
The next logical question, then, would be to ask, under what
authority did Congress provide for the protection of archaeological
resources on Indian lands? While this question is beyond the reach
of this Comment, two potential sources of congressional authority
over Indian affairs are noteworthy. First, Cohen claimed that the In-
dian Commerce Clause'37 has become the "primary provision support-
ing modern exercises of federal power over Indians" because the
Clause's breadth extends to transactions between non-Indians and
131 Id. at 487.
I' See id. (citingJohnson, 21 U.S. at 587-88).
'M Id. at 209-10.
15 Id. at 209.
426 U.S. 529, 536 (1976).
3., See COHEN, supra note 117 at 520 ("Even land held by a tribe in fee simple is subject to the
statutory restraints against alienation ... despite the fact that title is not held by the United
States as trustee."); see also The Nonintercourse Act, Pub. L. 107-36, 4 Stat. 730 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 177 (2001)) (prohibiting "grant, lease or other conveyance of [Indian] lands" unless
made by "treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the constitution").
137 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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tribal Indians that are not "interstate in character."1" Second, by in-
cluding "Indian lands" in ARPA, Congress may have been attempting
to fulfill its role as trustee over Indian affairs. Under this analysis,
Cohen stated: "[W] here Congress is exercising its authority over In-
dians rather than some other distinctive power, the trust obligation
apparently requires that its statutes be based on a determination that
the Indians will be protected. Otherwise such statutes would not be
rationally related to the trustee obligation."'3 9 Even though Congress
may not have expressly identified its source of authority for enacting
ARPA, it is evident from Section 470aa(a)-(b) of ARPA and the legis-
lative history of the Act that Congress desired to eliminate the inces-
sant plunder and destruction of archaeological resources on public
and Indian lands.14°
CONCLUSION
Applying the "real classic theory" of Property Clause legislation to
ARPA proves to be a simple task although the legislative history does
not mention the Property Clause as the congressional basis for enact-
ing any portion of ARPA. The more difficult endeavor, neverthe-
less, is trying to determine if congressional inclusion of "Indian
lands" prevents one from construing ARPA entirely as Property
Clause legislation. I conclude that, because ARPA applies equally to
public lands and Indian lands alike, the Act cannot be viewed solely
as Property Clause Legislation because "Indian lands" are not consid-
ered to be lands that belong to the United States.' 42 It may be best,
therefore, to view the statute as being enacted pursuant to several
enumerated congressional powers in an effort to protect and pre-
serve archaeological resources for future generations.
138 COHEN, supra note 117, at 208.
139 Id. at 221.
140 See 16 U.S.C. § 470aa (2001); see also supra text accompanying notes 2-9.
141 See generally 125 CONG. REC. 17,391, 21,237 (1979) for the substance of congressional
debates pertinent to ARPA's enactment.
142 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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